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The disposition for prosocial conduct, which contributes to cooperation as arising during social interaction, requires cortical network dynamics respon-
sive to the development of social ties, or care about the interests of specific interaction partners. Here, we formulate a dynamic computational model
that accurately predicted how tie formation, driven by the interaction history, influences decisions to contribute in a public good game. We used model-
driven functional MRI to test the hypothesis that brain regions key to social interactions keep track of dynamics in tie strength. Activation in the medial
prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and posterior cingulate cortex tracked the individuals public good contributions. Activation in the bilateral posterior superior
temporal sulcus (pSTS), and temporo-parietal junction was modulated parametrically by the dynamically developing social tieas estimated by our
modelsupporting a role of these regions in social tie formation. Activity in these two regions further reflected inter-individual differences in tie
persistence and sensitivity to behavior of the interaction partner. Functional connectivity between pSTS and mPFC activations indicated that the
representation of social ties is integrated in the decision process. These data reveal the brain mechanisms underlying the integration of interaction
dynamics into a social tie representation which in turn influenced the individuals prosocial decisions.
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INTRODUCTION
Unlike most animal species, humans cooperate with individuals
beyond kin and reproductive partners. We also have close affective
relationships with genetically unrelated individuals and the strength
of these relationships influences our level of cooperation with others.
Neural studies of human social behavior have recently begun to ex-
plore the question of affective attachment such as friendship (Krienen
et al., 2010; Fareri et al., 2012), sympathy (Decety and Chaminade,
2003) and romantic attachment (Aron et al., 2005; Fisher et al., 2005;
Zeki, 2007). Notably, the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) is
implicated in response to cooperative partners (Singer et al., 2006),
friends and loved ones (Bartels and Zeki, 2000), while the medial pre-
frontal cortex (mPFC) is involved in making trait judgments of close
friends (Heatherton et al., 2006; Fareri et al., 2012), in cooperative
decisions (McCabe et al., 2001; Rilling et al., 2004) and in trust
(Krueger et al., 2007). However, only already existing ties have been
investigated while behavioral evidence suggests that interpersonal ties
can form rapidly during interaction with strangers and play an im-
portant role in social decision-making processes (van Dijk et al., 2002;
Sonnemans et al., 2006). The development of such interpersonal af-
fective bonds has not been accounted for in formal mathematical
models of social decision-making either, with only few exceptions
(van Dijk and van Winden, 1997). The brain processes underlying
the dynamics of tie formation are still unknown. More importantly,
the neural mechanisms by which social ties modulate economic
decision-making remain to be elucidated (Hein et al., 2010).
Economic models of interdependent utilities formalize the care for
others in our choice by allowing one’s utility to depend on the utility of
interacting partners (Sobel, 2005). The weight attributed to interaction
partners’ well-being in one’s own utility is typically considered as
stable, reflecting a personality trait, like in the well-known inequality
aversion models (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels,
2000). There is a growing awareness though that our preferences
may change depending on the relationship we form with the person
we are interacting with (van Winden et al., 2008) and that flexible
social preferences should be allowed for (Bowles, 2008; Fehr and
Hoff, 2011).
Here we investigate a model of choice, based on the theoretical
model of van Dijk and van Winden (1997), where the weight attributed
to the welfare of a specific interacting partnerdenoted as a social
tieis allowed to be dynamic and assumed to depend on two driving
factors: past interaction experiences (the existing tie) and impulses
generated by the current behavior of the partner. The social ties
model captures behavior remarkably well in two- and four-player
public good games (PGGs) (Pelloux et al., 2013, unpublished data).
In addition, it appears to perform better than fixed social preferences
models, including inequality aversion type of models (such as Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999) in tracking the often complex dynamic contribution
patterns.
We combined a direct model-based measure of tie formation with
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to characterize brain
computations underlying the dynamics of social tie formation and its
role in economic decision-making. The social tie model was estimated
in the context of a repeated pair-wise PGG. Such a game is designed to
study situations where individuals make contributions to goods that
benefit the whole group (e.g. neighborhood crime watch or pollution
reduction), while being tempted to benefit from the group provision
without suffering the cost of contributing themselves. Our goal was to
test whether brain regions dynamically track the tie formed between a
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participant and a counterpart. We were interested in distinguishing
regions encoding the impact derived from the other player’s choices
(the impulse component of the ties mechanism) and regions encoding
a more integrated, long-term signal corresponding to the tie.
Furthermore, we investigated how the tie is incorporated in the deci-
sion to contribute to the public good. We hypothesized that the tie
formed between interactive partners might be encoded in the pSTS,
temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), amygdala, AI and the ACC, with
some of these regions encoding the choice of the counterpart, and
other regions keeping track of the tie. If the tie with the counterpart
does influence decisions, we should observe tie-related signals during
subsequent decisions. Choosing to contribute to the public good might
implicate regions involved in valuation and action selection such as the
orbitofrontal cortex, the mPFC and the posterior cingulate cortex
(PCC).
METHODS
Participants
Twenty-nine pairs of healthy volunteers participated in the experiment
for financial compensation. The brain activity of one participant of
each pair was measured using fMRI; for the second participant, behav-
ior only was monitored. Participants were Dutch or international ex-
change students at the University of Amsterdam. One pair was
excluded because of MRI data acquisition problems. For three scanned
participants, we obtained a constant alpha (tie) value of 0, based on the
behavioral model estimation; therefore, it was not possible to estimate
any parametric modulation of the tie value in the fMRI model. Thus,
25 scanned participants (12 females) and their interaction partners
were included in the fMRI analyses. Scanned participants had an
average age of 22.57 (s.d. 2.49). Their 25 interaction partners had
an average age of 23.3 (s.d. 4.5). The study was approved by the local
ethics committee, and complied with relevant laws and institutional
guidelines. Written informed consent was obtained from all partici-
pants prior to experimentation.
Experimental procedure
Participants were tested in pairs. Of each pair, one subject was pos-
itioned in the scanner while the other was seated in a separate room.
The procedure was fully anonymous, such that subjects would never
see each other or get any information about the other subject other
than through computer-interfaced interaction. Each pair played 29
rounds of a PGG. Before the first and after the 25th rounds of the
PGG, subjects were administered a distributional outcome test
(DOT) (Fahrenfort et al., 2012), an empirical measure of interpersonal
ties. After the second DOT, they played the remaining four rounds of
the PGG. In standard PGGs, contributions typically drop in the last
rounds. The second DOT was thus administered before the end of the
PGG in order to avoid any contamination of the end of game effect on
the tie measurement. Participants then completed a post-scan ques-
tionnaire related to the task and the balanced emotional empathy scale
(BEES) (Mehrabian and Epstein, 1972; Mehrabian, 1997). After the
experiment, participants were paid out according to their earning
during the tasks. Earnings summed up to an average of 45 euros per
participant. Results concerning the DOT, the last four PGG rounds
and the BEES have been published elsewhere (Fahrenfort et al., 2012).
Public good game
Participants played 29 rounds of a non-linear PGG with the same
interaction partner. In each round, participants could freely divide
12 monetary units (MU) between their private account and a public
account. The private account generated earnings for the participant
only, whereas the public account benefitted both players. The payoff
consequences of contributions to the public account were made expli-
cit by use of an on-screen payoff matrix (Table 1).
Payoffs of subject (i) in this table were given by
P ¼ 14ðgi þ gjÞ þ 32ð12 giÞ  ð12 giÞ2  160; ð1Þ
where gi stands for a subject i’s own contribution to the public account,
whereas gj denotes the other subject’s contribution to the public ac-
count. The game has an interior standard Nash equilibrium, equal to a
contribution of 3 MU. The social optimum is also interior in the action
space and corresponds to a contribution of 10 MU. Payoffs were ex-
pressed in MU and paid out according to the exchange rate 100
MU¼ 0.60 Euro. Prior to the PGG, extensive instructions were
given, followed by nine multiple-choice questions to ascertain that
instructions were understood.
Time course of a trial
Each trial consisted of three phases: (i) decision about contribution;
(ii) decision about expectation of the other’s contribution; and (iii)
feedback (Figure 1 and Supplementary Figure S2 for details).
Social ties model estimation
The behavioral model implemented in this study is based on the the-
oretical social ties model of van Dijk and van Winden (1997). In this
model positive or negative bonds between interacting people are
assumed to develop. This is formalized via the concept of an inter-
dependent utility function by allowing the weight attached to another
individual’s utility to express the bond developed during interaction
with that individual. Importantly, and in contrast with other models,
this weight is dynamic and evolves over time depending on the positive
or negative interaction experiences of the individuals that are involved.
In the case of our PGG, these experiences concern the observed con-
tributions of an interacting partner compared with a reference contri-
bution. Theoretically, the social ties model is appealing because it can
in principle account for various kinds of behavior observed in the
literature, such as selfish behavior, behavior related to fixed other-re-
garding preferences like altruism, spite and inequity aversion, as well as
mimicking behavior and reciprocity (van Winden, 2012).
More specifically, our mathematical model comprises the following
equations. We consider dyads, consisting of individuals i and j.
Individual i’s social tie at time t with j is formalized by attaching a
Table 1 Payoff matrix of the PGG
Contribution Other
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
0 80 94 108 122 136 150 164 178 192 206 220 234 248
1 85 99 113 127 141 155 169 183 197 211 225 239 253
2 88 102 116 130 144 158 172 186 200 214 228 242 256
3 89 103 117 131 145 159 173 187 201 215 229 243 257
Y 4 88 102 116 130 144 158 172 186 200 214 228 242 256
O 5 85 99 113 127 141 155 169 183 197 211 225 239 253
U 6 80 94 108 122 136 150 164 178 192 206 220 234 248
7 73 87 101 115 129 143 157 171 185 199 213 227 241
8 64 78 92 106 120 134 148 162 176 190 204 218 232
9 53 67 81 95 109 123 137 151 165 179 193 207 221
10 40 54 68 82 96 110 124 138 152 166 180 194 208
11 25 39 53 67 81 95 109 123 137 151 165 179 193
12 8 22 36 50 64 78 92 106 120 134 148 162 176
Each line corresponds to a possible contribution of the participant (YOU), columns are possible
contributions of the partner (OTHER). The number in each cell denotes the payoff of the participant
given both contributions. The standard Nash equilibrium is a contribution of 3 by both players,
thus earning 131. The social optimum (Pareto optimal solution) is to contribute 10, with a payoff
of 180.
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weight ijt to j’s payoff (denoted as Pjt) in i’s utility function (denoted
as Uit):
Uit ¼ Pit þ ijt :Pjt : ð2Þ
The dynamics of the social tie mechanism is represented by:
ijt ¼ 1i:ijt1 þ 2i :Iijt1; ð3Þ
where 1i 0 and 2i 0. The parameter 1i indicates the tie persistence
(which is inversely related to tie decay) and 2i the tie proneness of
individual i. The parameter 2i indicates the strength with which an
interaction experience, represented by the impulse Iij, feeds the social
tie. This impulse is itself assumed to be determined by the difference
between the observed actual behavior of the other and some reference
point. In the PGG considered here, the impulse is taken to correspond
to the other’s contribution (denoted by gjt) minus a reference contri-
bution (g refit ).
Iijt ¼ gjt  g refit ; ð4Þ
Equations (1)–(4) are a discrete time implementation of the model
of van Dijk and van Winden (1997). We extend this model to allow for
stochasticity by applying the following probabilistic choice function:
ikt ¼ e
iUikt
XK
k¼0e
iUikt
; ð5Þ
where ikt stands for the probability that i chooses contribution k at
period t (with K indicating the maximum contribution), and i is a
parameter calibrating how sensitive i’s choice is to differences in utility
(choices are random if i¼ 0, while utility is maximized if i ! 1).
We estimated the social ties model for the scanned group. Parameter
estimation was done using maximum likelihood estimation with the
Matlab function fmincon. The estimation was first run at the group
level, for model selection purposes. Then it was run separately for each
individual, using participant’s contributions in the 25 rounds of the
PGG before the DOT interruption. The , 1 and 2 parameters were
estimated individually. Previous work revealed that the model per-
formed better when the reference contribution was put equal to the
standard Nash equilibrium as opposed to one’s own contribution or
the expected contribution of the other (Pelloux et al., 2013, unpub-
lished data). We thus used the standard Nash equilibrium contribution
as the reference contribution in the impulse (g refit ¼ 3). The value of 
was computed according to equation (3), using zero for its starting
value (for parsimony, as the use of an additional free parameter ren-
dered similar parameter estimates). We thus obtained a series of 25
values of  for each participant. These values were then used as a
parametric regressor in the fMRI models (see below).
fMRI: data acquisition and analyses
See supplementary material for images acquisition and pre-processing
methods.
fMRI model
Voxel-wide differences in BOLD contrast within the smoothed nor-
malized images were examined using FMRIB Software Library (FSL)
FEAT. Standard neuroimaging methods using the general linear model
(GLM) were used with the first level (individual subject effects) ana-
lyses providing contrasts for higher level (group effects) analyses.
Multiple event-related regressors of interests were included in the
same GLM (instruction own contribution, decision, button press(es),
decision validation, show choice, instruction expected contribution
other, decision expected contribution other, button press(es) 2, deci-
sion validation 2, show choice2 and feedback; Figure 1) in order to
attribute signal variance to all known sources of variance. Both instruc-
tion periods were modeled as epochs of 3-s duration, time-locked to
the display of the instruction screens. The decision period was modeled
as a variable epoch, time-locked to the display of the payoff matrix and
ending with the button press indicating choice validation (self-paced).
Similarly the decision of the expected contribution of the partner had
its onset locked to the payoff matrix display and lasted until response
validation. Two delta function regressors modeled button presses to
navigate between rows and columns of the payoff matrix to choose
the contribution level and expected contribution of the partner,
respectively. The validation periods were modeled with two regressors
time-locked to the last option selection and ending with the decision
validation button press. Both post-decision periods (show choice) were
modeled as epochs of 2-s duration, time-locked to the decision valid-
ation button press. The feedback period started with the display of the
feedback screen, with 16-s duration.
Additional regressors of interest were introduced to model paramet-
ric modulations. The social tie parameter estimated with the behavioral
model was introduced at the time of decision. Given the lengthy aver-
age decision time, it is difficult to determine exactly what time-window
Fig. 1 Schematic task timeline. Two participants simultaneously played in a PGG. Each participant was first asked to choose how much they wanted to contribute to the public good. Participants were first
presented with an instruction screen with the sentence ‘How do you want to allocate your MU this round?’ during 3 s. Then the payoff matrix appeared with the choice options of the participant depicted as
rows and the choice options of the partner depicted in columns. They could navigate between rows to make their choice using two buttons of an MR-compatible response box placed in the subject’s right hand
and validated their choice at any time using a third button. This choice period was self-paced, thus introducing some natural variability in trial time course. Their choice was shown during 2 s. Then, a second
instruction screen displaying ‘How do you think the other will allocate his or her MU in this round?’ was presented during 3 s. The payoff matrix appeared and they could choose the expected contribution of the
other by navigating between columns of the matrix (self-paced). This choice was also shown during 2 s. A screen displayed ‘Please wait for the other to respond’ during 500 ms followed by a black screen
displayed until the other participant had completed their choice, with a minimum of 6 s. The feedback screen, displayed during 16 s, then showed both participants’ contributions to the public account as well as
the participant’s payoff.
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optimally reflects variables that track the decision mechanism.
However, signals related to the output of the decision are more
likely to occur just prior to confirmation of this decision rather than
at the beginning of the decision phase. Therefore, the effect of contri-
bution level was modeled during the validation phase. The expected
contribution of the other and the expected payoff (computed from the
participant’s actual contribution and the expected contribution of the
other) were added to the model during the period in which partici-
pants reported the expected contribution of the other. The parametric
effects of the impulse and of the payoff were added as modulators of
the feedback regressors. All regressors were convolved with a canonical
double-gamma hemodynamic response function, applying temporal
filtering and without temporal derivative. Orthogonalization was not
applied.
Inter-individual differences in tie-persistence and tie-proneness were
investigated, using the individual 1 and 2 estimatesas additional
regressors in the higher-level analysis.
Statistical threshold, activations localization
and reported statistics
Reported coordinates conform to the Montreal Neurological Institute
space. Activations are reported as significant when P< 0.05, corrected
for multiple comparisons using cluster-wise control of family-wise
error (FWE) rate with an initial cluster threshold of z¼ 2.3
(P¼ 0.01), unless specified. Anatomic labeling of activated regions
was performed using atlases in FSLview.
RESULTS
Behavior
Scanned participants and their interaction partner’s choices are shown
in Supplementary Figure S1. Scanned participants contributed an aver-
age of 6.258 MU in the public good and their non-scanned counterpart
6.235 MU. They expected their partner to contribute 6.215 and 6.687
MU, respectively. Quite a few pairs of participants manage to reach full
cooperation (e.g. participants 1, 6, 13, 17, 20, 22, 23, 24 and 25,
Supplementary Figure S1). The scanned group earned an average
of 152.55 MU (SEM¼ 3.84) per trial which summed up to 26.54
euros (SEM¼ 0.67). The non-scanned group earned 151.94 MU
(SEM¼ 3.96) per trial, and gained 26.44 euros (SEM¼ 0.69) overall
in the PGG. There was no difference in contribution level and earnings
(t-test P> 0.9) between the two groups. The average time for choosing
how many MU to contribute was 14.14 s (SEM¼ 2.48) for the scanned
participants and 14.49 s (SEM¼ 1.19) for their interaction partners.
Model estimation and comparison
Our estimates provide direct evidence of social ties being formed
during the interaction in a PGG. The model significantly explained
participant’s choices (Log likelihood¼1604.82, Wald 2¼ 3606.2,
P< 0.0001) and all parameters were significant (¼ 0.0456, SE¼
0.0037, P< 0.001; 1¼ 0.4960, SE¼ 0.0583, P< 0.001; 2¼ 0.0832,
SE¼ 0.0090, P< 0.001). The model performed better than the same
model excluding 1 (LR test: 
2¼ 48.94, P< 0.0001), or excluding 2
(2¼ 380.90, P< 0.0001). Ipso facto our findings run counter to the
standard assumption of fixed selfish preferences. Moreover, the
observed tie-persistence (1¼ 0.496) indicates that behavior is not
only driven by direct reciprocity, but also modulated by previous ex-
periences (impulses). The estimate of this parameter further indicates
that the impact of an impulse is reduced to 10% of its original value
after almost three rounds. Individual fits (Supplementary Figure S1)
suggest that the model performed very well in capturing variability in
behavior as predicted contributions closely matched actual contribu-
tions for many participants. As strategic motives might be implicated
in this game, we compared the myopic-non strategic -version of the
social ties model with an extended version accounting for expected
reciprocity (Supplementary material). The extended model allowing
for (one-period) forward-looking behavior did not perform better, at
the group level, than the standard, myopic model described above
(2¼ 0.0106, P¼ 0.92). The standard, more parsimonious model
with three parameters (, 1 and 2) and without forward-looking
was thus selected for further analyses, in particular for computing
the tie parameter used in the fMRI analyses. We also compared the
social tie model with a model of fixed social preferences, where  is
directly estimated on the data, and an inequality aversion model
adapted from Fehr and Schmidt (1999), exploiting our finding that
participants are rather myopic (non-strategic) and that we have data
regarding the expected contribution of the other (Supplementary ma-
terial). To compare the model performance, we computed for each
model the root-mean-squared error (RMSE) which reflects the differ-
ence between the choices predicted by a model and the actual choices
of the participants (Supplementary material). The social tie model
provided the best RMSE (1.9955) compared with the fixed preferences
model (RMSE¼ 2.2578) and the inequality aversion model
(RMSE¼ 2.1591).
fMRI results
In the model, the tie parameter is updated with an impulse function
which is the distance between the contribution of the other player and
the standard Nash equilibrium contribution. Thus, if the neural com-
putations are in line with our model, the impulse function should be
first represented in the participant’s brain during the feedback phase,
providing a signal to update the tie value. If the tie has a role in the
decision process, we hypothesized that its amplitude would modulate
the brain activity during the subsequent choice phase.
Parametric effect of the social tie (alpha) parameter
during the choice phase
During the choice period, pSTS and TPJ [peak voxels Montreal
Neurological Institute (MNI) coordinates (x, y, z); left: (54, 56,
8) and right: (52, 62, 24)], PCC (2, 34, 70) and several areas in
the frontal lobe showed a negative parametric modulation by the social
tie parameter estimated using our behavioral model (Figure 2 and
Supplementary Table S2). Because some pairs of participants showed
very little variability in their decisions, resulting in almost constant tie
values (participants 20–25 in Supplementary Figure S1), we also report
results excluding those participants. Prefrontal cortex activations, es-
pecially in mPFC, did not survive, suggesting that these activations
might capture decision-related signals not directly related to tie-encod-
ing. The positive contrast only revealed activation in the occipital
cortex which is likely to be related to higher visual and motor activity
associated with stronger tie rather than encoding the tie per se.
Parametric effect of the impulse during the feedback phase
During the phase in which the other player’s contribution and the
payoff were revealed, the bilateral insula and right superior temporal
gyrus, TPJ and pSTS were parametrically modulated by the impulse
(i.e. contribution of the other minus the standard Nash equilibrium
contribution). (Figure 3 and Supplementary Table S3).
Activity related to the model parameters 1 and 2
In our model, 1 represents the tie persistence and thus reveals the
speed at which the tie deteriorates over time if the interaction is not
maintained. 2 represents the tie proneness, the impact of the other’s
behavior on the new tie. These two parameters are thought to reflect
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stable personality traits in our model. We thus tested the hypothesis
that inter-individual differences in these two parameters will result in
different activity in brain areas encoding the tie when a decision is
made. We used the 1 and 2 parameters as parametric regressors at the
higher level of brain data analysis. During the decision phase, 1 cor-
related with activity in the right TPJ (MNI coordinate at P< 0.001 unc.,
46, 74, 18) and right pSTS (46, 40, 12) and 2 correlated with
activity in the left TPJ (54, 46, 26).
Parametric effect of contribution magnitude
We next looked at brain areas whose activity was directly involved in
the process of deciding how much to contribute (see ‘fMRI model’
section in ‘Methods’ section). The post-central gyrus (46 28, 62) and
posterior cingulate (0, 16, 32), bilateral insula (left: 44, 6, 4; right:
32, 12, 6), and mPFC (6, 54, 2) were modulated parametrically by
contribution magnitude (Figure 4 and Supplementary Table S4).
Connectivity
Given the structure of our model, an important implication of our
finding is that neural activity encoding the tie value will influence
activity of regions implicated in the decision process. Using psycho-
physiological interactions (PPIs, Supplementary material for methods),
we found a significant increase in correlations between the activity in
pSTS and activity of mPFC and PCC during the decision phase (PPI
analysis, masking with results from parametric effect of contribution,
Figure 5). In order to confirm that the common signal between the two
sets of areas contains information related to the tie values, a beta seed
correlation analysis was performed, testing for correlations between the
parameter estimates of the tie value regressors in the pSTS (MNI
coordinate 46, 40, 0) and parameter estimates of the contribution
magnitude regressors in the whole brain. Results confirmed the link
between the activity related to tie encoding in the pSTS and to con-
tribution magnitude in the mPFC. Parameter estimates of the tie para-
metric effect at the beginning of the decision phase significantly
correlated with parameter estimates of the contribution parametric
effect during the validation phase.
DISCUSSION
In this study we aimed at characterizing the brain mechanisms impli-
cated in choosing how much to contribute in a repeated PGG. We
tested a model of choice in which the weight attributed to another
individual’s utility is allowed to evolve as a function of the reactions to
the other’s behavior. In our computational framework, this weight
represents the social tie that forms between the subject and the other
player as the interaction unfolds. We identified specific computational
signals needed to keep track of the tie and to mediate the influence of
the tie in the decision process.
The model of the tie mechanism presented here has two main com-
ponents, an existing tie value and an impulse function. The impulse
function captures the impact of the other’s choice, relative to a refer-
ence contribution level, in the previous trial on the new tie value.
Because the (selfish) Nash contribution level performed best as refer-
ence level, brain activations related to the impulse can be interpreted
simply as encoding the other’s choice, as the latter two variables differ
by a constant only, their effect cannot be distinguished in fMRI ana-
lyses. At the time participants saw the other player’s choice, this in-
formation was encoded in the insula, a region previously implicated in
social affective reaction like empathy (Singer et al., 2004b; Fahrenfort
et al., 2012), and the superior temporal gyrus and pSTS, an area impli-
cated in inferring others’ beliefs and intentions (Saxe and Wexler,
2005; Frith and Singer, 2008) or perceiving the behavioral relevance
of other agents (Carter et al., 2012). In the model, the impulse function
is used to update the tie value. This tie value represents how much we
care about the other. The tie builds over time and therefore constitutes
an integrated signal. It represents the history of the interaction with the
other, more particularly the history of the reactions to the other’s
behavior, and can thus be seen as a stock variable of these impulses.
Tie value
%
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Fig. 2 Parametric effect of social ties. Top: At the time of choice, activity in the pSTS and TPJ was parametrically modulated by the value of the tie estimated by the behavioral model. Z map projected on the
participants’ averaged brain. Bottom: Percent signal change (SE) in the right STS cluster from the parametric analysis (235 voxels, peak voxel MNI coordinate: 46, 40, 0). The tie value was binned into eight
equal categories. The x axis shows the median tie value of each category.
Fig. 3 Parametric effect of the impulse. Brain areas in which activity showed a parametric modulation
by the impulse during the feedback phase. Z map projected on the participants’ averaged brain.
Neural dynamics of social tie formation SCAN (2014) 5 of 8
 by guest on D
ecem
ber 6, 2014
http://scan.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
We found that the tie value was specifically encoded in the pSTS and
TPJ. This finding extends previous results showing a correlation be-
tween pSTS activity and liking ratings of an interacting partner
(Fahrenfort et al., 2012), and a role of pSTS in signaling social
significance such as keeping track of other agent’s strategies (Haruno
and Kawato, 2009), one’s influence on the other agent’s choices
(Hampton et al., 2008), cooperativeness in a prisoner’s dilemma
game (Singer et al., 2004a), as well as the reliability of another person’s
advice (Behrens et al., 2008). Inter-individual differences in the way the
impulse impacts the new tie and the decay of the tie were also found in
the pSTS and TPJ. pSTS and TPJ activity thus reflected a signal inte-
grating the choice of the other in the previous round with the tie
previously formed with the other. The relationship between the tie
value and the pSTS and TPJ activity was negative. This is consistent
with previous findings concerning the brain underpinnings of friend-
ship (Bartels and Zeki, 2000), although another study reports the op-
posite relationship (Krienen et al., 2010). It is not clear whether the
role of the pSTS and TPJ in inferring other’s beliefs and intentions and
their involvement in encoding social ties are supported by the same
neurons within these regions. If this is the case however, it makes sense
that growing closer to somebody decreases activity in these regions as
efforts are made to infer the intentions of others also decreases with
closeness.
Finally, we found that the activity of the pSTS at the beginning of the
choice phase correlated with the activity of the mPFC at the end of the
choice phase. Other studies have indicated a role for this region in
decision-making (Glimcher, 2009), especially in a social context
(Hampton et al., 2008; Bault et al., 2011). All components of our
behavioral model are reflected in the activity of specific regions,
which together seem to constitute a network involved in updating
and maintaining social preferences.
The pSTS and TPJ are consistently activated during social inter-
action. Yet the nature of the tasks used in many experiments makes
it difficult to determine the type of computation they might perform.
Nevertheless recent model-based fMRI studies have hypothesized
learning mechanisms based on reinforcement learning and belief-
based models (Behrens et al., 2008; Hampton et al., 2008; Haruno
and Kawato, 2009; Zhu et al., 2012; Fouragnan et al., 2013; van den
Bos et al., 2013). The learning in our social tie model is very different
from reinforcement learning and belief-based models, as it concerns
the nature of the valuation function itself, via Uit(.; ijt), instead of the
value of a choice option for a given valuation function, like a standard
Q-value. In a sense, the learning involves an ‘internal state’, namely
one’s social preferences, and not how one can reach one’s goal opti-
mally by acting on the environment. The social tie model thus ac-
counts for decisions that may decrease the agent’s reward as long as
it benefits an interaction partner who proved to be kind or cooperative
in the past.
In addition, previous fMRI studies investigating socially interactive
decisions have focused on strategic motives such as predicting
A
B
Fig. 5 Connectivity analysis. (A) PPI from the pSTS. Psychophysiological interactions associated with
decision events with pSTS activations as seed region and mPFC and PCC as target regions. The brain
slice on the left shows the seed region, functionally defined from the parametric analysis of the tie
parameter (also reported in Figure 2, FWE cluster corrected, initial threshold z¼ 2.5). The brain slice
on the right shows the PPI results at P< 0.001 uncorrected, masked with activation map from
Figure 4. (B) Beta seed correlation results. At the time of decision, activity related to tie encoding in
the pSTS correlated with activity related to the contribution in the mPFC. The image on the right
shows the voxels which activity significantly correlated with the seed region. T map projected on the
subjects’ averaged brain, P< 0.001, uncorrected.
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Fig. 4 Parametric effect of the contribution to the public good. Top: At the time of choice, activity in the mPFC and PCC was parametrically modulated by the contribution to the public good by the subject in
the current trial. Z map projected on the subjects’ averaged brain. Bottom: Percent signal change (SE) in the mPFC cluster from the parametric analysis (345 voxels, MNI coordinate: 6, 54, 2; Supplementary
Table S4), where the contribution magnitudes were groups into four categories.
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intentions of others in order to select the best responding action
(Behrens et al., 2008; Hampton et al., 2008) or building a positive
reputation in order to benefit from the favors of others in the future
(King-Casas et al., 2005). A computational role of pSTS and TPJ has
been established in evaluating the intentions of others (Behrens et al.,
2008) and the influence of one’s own behavior on others (Hampton
et al., 2008). Note that in our study allowing for strategic motives such
as expected reciprocity did not improve our model performance. We
extend these previous findings by showing that pSTS and TPJ dynam-
ically encode the weight attached to the well-being of others in co-
operative decisions. Neural processing of other-regarding preferences
has been previously attributed to areas of the reward system, mainly
the striatum. It has been argued though that it was unclear whether
such activity truly reflects social preferences or the value of the social
situation to the individual (Behrens et al., 2009). To our knowledge,
this is the first time trial-by-trial other-regarding preferences have been
estimated and regressed against BOLD measurements. We found that
activity of the pSTS and TPJ reflected dynamic other-regarding pref-
erences rather than the striatum, consistent with a role of these regions
in signaling cooperative partners (Singer et al., 2006), friends and loved
ones (Bartels and Zeki, 2000).
Interestingly, our results parallel those of Hampton et al. (2008) who
aimed to uncover the neural underpinnings of a model of choice that
includes the influence that a player’s action has on an opponent’s
strategy. They found that, while mPFC tracked the predicted reward
associated with a particular choice, a signal that may be used to guide
choice during a game, activity in pSTS corresponded to an update of
the influence signal once feedback about the game has been provided
(Hampton et al., 2008). Thus, results from the application of quanti-
tative models to these two different social decision-making environ-
ments appear consistent with a role of the pSTS in signaling social
information relevant to the current situation and goal of the agent, and
in modulating decision guiding signals in the mPFC.
We found a higher correlation between the pSTS and mPFC activity
during the decision phase than during other events of the trial.
Previous studies reported functional connectivity between the pSTS
or TPJ and the (ventro-) medial frontal cortex while resting (Mars
et al., 2012), making prosocial decisions (Hare et al., 2010) or choosing
among social rewards (Smith et al., 2014). Other studies found similar
connectivity during the feedback period (Hampton et al., 2008;
van den Bos et al., 2013) when prediction error signals are computed
in the brain. In addition to showing that activity of the pSTS and
mPFC synchronized during decisions using PPI, we further suggest
that the signal shared between these two regions contains information
about the tie value. Indeed, beta seed correlations revealed that pSTS
tie-related signals during the decision process modulated mPFC signals
related to the output of the decision at the time participants validated
their choice. Given the temporal ordering between the two signals, we
may reasonably assume that signals in the pSTS modulate mPFC ac-
tivity. The tie information is thus integrated into the decision process
through interacting brain networks including the pSTS, TPJ on one
hand, and the mPFC and PCC on the other hand.
An alternative theory of the role of TPJ proposes that its higher
activity during social decision-making may be attributed to attentional
effects, as social interaction might be demanding in that respect (for a
review, see Carter and Huettel, 2013). Although we modeled response
times in our fMRI analyses, we cannot rule out completely such an
explanation. Indeed, the payoff matrix in our task contains informa-
tion that might take time to process, yielding to relatively long re-
sponse times. However, if attention is influenced by the tie strength,
it will be internally rather than externally reorienting as the process of
tie building requires integrating information that arises from the con-
text and personal goals. We thus concur with the proposition of Carter
and Huettel (2013) that TPJ integrating information derived from at-
tention is not incompatible with a role of this region in signaling social
significance.
To conclude, although reciprocity-based social preferences models
take into account immediate past actions of interaction partners, we
show that the longer-term history of the interaction can influence be-
havior significantly. Thus, the use of a social preferences model in
which the attitude toward the interaction partner is formed in an en-
dogenous and dynamic way, reflecting the development of bonds be-
tween individuals, appears appealing. Indeed, we showed that such a
social ties model of dynamic other-regarding preferences tracks rather
closely individuals’ contributions in a PGG and that specific brain
areas track the developing ties, providing evidence of the biological
plausibility of this model.
SUPPLEMENTARY DATA
Supplementary data are available at SCAN online.
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BEHAVIOR AND MODEL FIT 
Model extension: forward looking behavior 
We estimated an extension of the model accounting for strategic motives such as expected reciprocity. 
The model allows for (one period) forward looking behavior (Bone, Hey, & Suckling, 2009; Keser & Van 
Winden, 2000) by adding the next two equations to the model. The intertemporal utility function of i – 
denoted by Vit, and to be substituted for 𝑈𝑖𝑡  in the probabilistic choice function (4) – is represented by: 
Vit = Uit + λUit+1 
where λ stands for a i’s time discount factor. With choices being simultaneously made in each period, the 
computation of i’s choice requires an expectation regarding j’s current and next period’s contributions, 
respectively, denoted by gjt
exp and gjt+1
exp (in our experiment subjects self-reported gjt
exp). For forward-
looking subjects we suppose the following simple adaptive expectation formation process concerning 
gjt+1
exp, to allow for strategic behavior (see Pelloux et al. 2013): 
gjt+1exp = φ∙git + (1−φ)∙gjtexp     (0 ≤ φ ≤ 1) 
where  the  gjt+1exp  is the expected  contribution  of  the  player  in  the  next  period. gjt+1exp  is  
determined  by  a convex  combination  of  gjtexp, the  expectation for  the  current  period  and  git, the  
player’s  own  current contribution.  The  parameter  φ   is  thus  measuring  the  expected  reciprocity  
from  the  interaction partner. 
Model comparison: Social ties, fixed social preferences, and inequality aversion 
We estimated a model of fixed social preferences of the following form 
𝑈𝑖𝑘𝑡 = 𝑃𝑖𝑘𝑡 − α𝑖 . 𝑃𝑗𝑘𝑡            
where 𝑃𝑖𝑘𝑡 and  𝑃𝑗𝑘𝑡  the expected payoff of player i and j respectively, in period t for a 
contribution level k.  
We also compared the social tie model with a model of inequality aversion à la Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999).  Although their model was not developed to study repeated interaction, it seems 
interesting to investigate the following implementation, exploiting our finding that subjects are 
rather myopic (non-strategic) and our data on the expected contribution of the other: 
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𝑈𝑖𝑘𝑡 =  𝑃𝑖𝑘𝑡  −  𝛼𝑖. max(𝑃𝑗𝑘𝑡 − 𝑃𝑖𝑘𝑡; 0) −  𝛽𝑖. max(𝑃𝑖𝑘𝑡 − 𝑃𝑗𝑘𝑡; 0)     
where 𝛽𝑖 ≤ 𝛼𝑖  and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝑖 ≤ 1 . α represents disadvantageous inequality aversion and β 
advantageous inequality aversion, while 𝑃𝑖𝑘𝑡 and  𝑃𝑗𝑘𝑡  are the respective expected payoffs of 
player i and j in period t for a contribution level k, given the expectation i has about j’s 
contribution in t. Contrarily to the social tie and (standard) fixed social preferences model, the 
expected contribution does influence the ranking of 𝑈𝑖𝑘𝑡. Thus this model exploits additional 
information compared to the other two. 
To compare the performance of the different models, we computed and compared the root-
mean-squared error (RMSE), which reflects the difference between the choices predicted by a 
model and the actual choices of the participants.  A lower RMSE indicates a better fit of the 
model. 
 Social ties Inequality aversion Fixed preferences 
θ a 
(Std Err) 
0.0456** 
(0.0037) 
θ 
 
0.0176** 
(0.0028) 
θ 
 
0.0171** 
(0.0033) 
δ1 
(Std Err) 
0.4960** 
(0.0583) 
α 
1** 
(0.2043) 
α 
0.5376** 
(0.0494) 
δ2 
(Std Err) 
0.0832** 
(0.0090) 
β 
1** 
(0.0747) 
 
 
 
 
RMSE 1.9955  2.1591  2.2578 
   * p<0.05 ** p<0.001 
Table S1. Model comparison 
                                                          
a Note that theta is not scale-free because of the multiplication with the payoffs in U (see eq.(5) 
in main text). With the group-level estimate of 0.0456, for a selfish individual (alpha = 0), the 
odds of choosing 3 (the selfish Nash prediction) over 10 (the social optimal choice) are 9.3, while 
the random choice outcome would equal π(3)/π(10) = 1. For the average estimated theta at the 
individual level, 0.125 (Std Err = 0.215), the odds are as high 457.1.  Furthermore, for this theta 
value, out of the choice set of 13 contribution levels, the 3 contributions yielding the highest 
utility have a 54% chance of being played.     
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The estimated values of α and β of the inequality aversion model appeared at the limits of the 
constraints. When removing the constraints, we obtained α = 0.9748 and β = 1.8490. Note that 
these estimated values suggest that participants would avoid more advantageous than 
disadvantageous inequalities, and (because the estimated β is larger than 1) that participants 
would be willing to pay more than one dollar to diminish advantageous inequality by one dollar, 
which seems odd. Thus, it seems that inequality aversion cannot explain well the interaction 
dynamics in the public good game. 
5 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
Figure S1. Estimated tie parameter, contributions and model fit. For each scanned participant, the top graph represents the 
evolution of the estimated tie parameter over rounds. The bottom graph display the participant’s (plain blue line) and her 
interacting partner’s (plain black line) contributions to the public good. The dotted blue line represents the model fit, it shows 
the predicted contribution of the participant, using the individual previously estimated model parameters and the real 
contribution of the partner in the previous round.  We used the actual first contribution of the participant as starting value, 
computed the new tie and the contribution for subsequent rounds according to the social tie model. Participants 26 to 28 
were excluded from the fMRI analyses. 
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FMRI: DATA ACQUISITION, ANALYSES AND RESULT TABLES 
Images acquisition and preprocessing.  
Images were acquired on a Philips 3T Intera scanner. The functional recordings were acquired using a 
T2*-weighted sequence [40 coronal slices; flip angle (FA), 80°; echo time (TE), 30 ms; repetition time 
(TR), 2.3 s; slice thickness, 3 mm; field of view (FOV), 220  220 mm; in-plane voxel resolution, 2.3  2.3 
mm]. Sessions ended with the acquisition of a high-resolution anatomical image using a T1 turbo field 
echo sequence [182 coronal slices; FA, 8°; TE, 4.6 ms; TR, 9.6 s; slice thickness, 1.2 mm; FOV, 256  256 
mm; in-plane voxel resolution, 1  1 mm]. Pre-processing and data analysis was performed using the 
fMRI Expert Analysis Tool (FEAT), v5.98 from the FMRIB’s Software Library package (FSL, 
http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). fMRI images were motion corrected, slice-time aligned, aligned to the 
structural image of the subject, and spatially smoothed using a Gaussian kernel of 5 mm and high-pass 
temporally filtered using a Gaussian envelope of 50 s. Anatomical brains were extracted from the 
structural images, and transformed to the standard space of the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) 
using FMRIB’s Non-linear Image Registration Tool (FNIRT). Finally, the functional data were co-registered 
to the MNI brain using non-linear parameters obtained from FNIRT. 
Connectivity analyses: Psychophysiological interactions (PPIs). PPIs were computed from physiological 
activity averaged over the seed activation cluster. The seed activation cluster was defined functionally 
from the tie parameter contrast of the fMRI model. In order to define smaller clusters containing voxels 
with higher statistics, the cluster was defined using an initial cluster threshold of z=2.5 for multiple 
comparisons correction. Two clusters, in right TPJ (peak voxel: 50, -62, 24; 684 voxels) and right pSTS 
(peak voxel: 46, -40, 0; 235 voxels) were used. Results are reported for the pSTS cluster.  Psychological 
factors were the decision events. PPIs were then computed as the interaction between physiological and 
psychological factors in the GLM comprising all the regressors described above as well as the 
physiological and psychological factors. Results were then masked using the contribution parameter 
contrast of the fMRI model. Results are reported with p<0.001 uncorrected. Beta seed correlations. Beta 
seed correlations analyses were performed using the methodology described by Rissman et al. (2004). 
This first step was implemented in FSL in the context of a GLM containing two separate regressors per 
trial, one for the decision phase, modulated by the tie value, and one for the validation phase, 
modulated by the contribution level. The resulting parameter estimates (beta values) were sorted 
according to the stage from which they derived to form a set of decision-specific and a set of validation-
specific beta series. The seed region was the pSTS cluster described in the PPI analyses above (peak 
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voxel: 46, -40, 0; 235 voxels). The decision specific beta series was then averaged across seed voxels 
resulting in one beta series for the ROI. Correlation of the seed’s beta series with the validation-specific 
beta series of all other voxels in the brain was computed using Matlab (http://www.mathworks.com), 
and seed correlation maps were generated.  The correlation coefficients were then converted to z scores 
prior to statistical testing. Group-level random effects t tests were then conducted to identify voxels for 
which the mean of the individual subjects’ transformed correlation coefficients was reliably greater than 
zero. Results are reported with p<0.001 uncorrected. 
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fMRI results: tables 
Location Side Voxels Z p 
MNI 
Coordinates 
tie (positive contrast) 
       
 
Occipital pole * Bilateral 3252 4.92 <0.001 -6 -84 -16 
-tie (negative contrast) 
       
 
TPJ/pSTS* Right 1213 4.18 <0.001 50 -62 24 
 
Occipital cortex * Bilateral 3959 4.07 <0.001 10 -76 12 
 
pSTS* Left 1658 3.93 <0.001 -54 -56 8 
 
Precuneous/Postcentral gyrus* Bilateral 321 3.89 0.0117 2 -34 70 
 
Middle frontal gyrus Left 357 3.84 0.0058 -38 10 52 
 
Inferior frontal gyrus * Left 419 3.76 0.0018 -54 26 20 
 
mPFC Right 590 3.68 <0.001 10 64 24 
 
DLPFC Right 479 3.63 <0.001 32 30 46 
 vmPFC* Bilateral 476 3.56 <0.001 6 54 -8 
Table S2. Parametric effect of the tie parameter during the choice phase. Regions marked 
with * are regions which show a significant effect when excluding participants labelled 20 to 25 
in Figure S1. 
 
 
Location Side Voxels Z p MNI Coordinates 
+ impulse during the outcome phase 
       
 
Precentral gyrus (cluster incl. Sup 
temporal gyrus, TPJ, pSTS, insula) Right 1389 3.43 <0.001 50 0 46 
 
Insula Left 474 3.26 0.0082 -38 -14 -8 
- impulse during the outcome phase 
        Superior parietal lobule Left 362 3.64 0.0391 -36 -52 48 
  Angular gyrus Right 407 3.31 0.0206 40 -58 38 
          
Table S3. Parametric effect of impulse parameter during the feedback phase. 
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Location Side Voxels Z p MNI Coordinates 
+ contribution (positive contrast) 
       
 
occipital cortex Bilateral 3783 4.92 <0.001 14 -72 -4 
 
Postcentral gyrus (incl. PCC)  Bilateral 2418 4.69 <0.001 46 -28 62 
 
Insula/Putamen  Left 621 3.82 0.0011 -44 6 -4 
 
Insula/Putamen  Right 1503 3.81 <0.001 32 -12 -6 
 
mPFC/paracingulate gyrus  Bilateral 404 3.70 0.0193 6 54 -2 
 
Thalamus Bilateral 435 3.45 0.0124 -4 -20 8 
 
Superior temporal gyrus  Left 581 3.42 0.0018 -58 -18 0 
  mPFC  Right 584 3.41 0.0017 34 48 34 
Table S4. Parametric effect of the participant’s contribution to the public good during the 
choice phase.  
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TASK: SREENSHOTS  
 
 
 
 
Figure S2. Screenshots of the task main screens. 
 
 
